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The paper critically reviews retail-led regeneration and retail containment polices and their 
effects on the urban retail in the UK by analysing the effect that retail-led mega-schemes 
regeneration  projects  have  on the  economic  growth  of  inner  cities.  There  is  significant 
controversy whether mega-schemes in retail-led regeneration initiatives contribute to the 
growth of local economies or whether it leads to the pitch shifting and marginalisation of 
local retail.  The research focuses on two neighbouring strategies in Birmingham and Solihull 
to  determine  differences  in  the  application  of  retail-led  regeneration  in  inner  city  and 
peripheral locations.  Birmingham’s Bullring centre and Solihull’s Touchstone centre was 
researched using quantitative data on the growth of the retail sector in Birmingham and 
supplemented using interviews with key actors.  The paper critically analyses whether retail-
led  mega-schemes  have  a  net  positive  effect  on  the  economic  revitalisation  of  the 
deteriorating inner cities. The results of the research indicate that the retail-led regeneration 
initiative brought about a dual economy with a global inner core of national retail and the 
outer core of marginalised local retail.  The economic motive of implementing retail-led 
regeneration  is  doubted,  as  the  research  delivers  mixed  results.    However  the  research 
indicates that the strategic benefits of restructuring and marketing the city have become 
equally  if  of  not  more  important  in  retail-led  regeneration  initiatives  than  the  actual 





The face of urban retailing has radically changed in the past thirty years.  The short period 
of development liberalisations during the 1980’s created powerful retail monopolies in the 
form  of  regional  shopping  centres  developed  at  the  outskirts  of  cities.    This  period  of 
unencumbered  retail  growth  had  developed  over  1.5  million  m
2  of  retail  floorspace  to 
compete with traditional high street retail (Wrigley, 1998: 154).  This has had a serious 
impact  on  traditional  high  street  retail  and  the  self  contained  local  economy.    The  UK 
economy, formerly an inward focussed and self-sufficient social economy was suddenly and 
irrevocably integrated into the global economy.  In order to minimise the impact of the 
peripheral shopping centres two policy trends have been implemented since the 1990’s: 
retail-regeneration strategies and urban containment policies.   
Retail-led  regeneration  of  deprived  inner  cities  has  been  promoted  as  an  important 
mechanism that  local  authorities  have  in their  arsenal  to  kickstart  lagging  localities  into 
generating ‘real economic growth, jobs and creative and exciting urban spaces’ (DTZ, 2008: 
5).   The common received wisdom amongst planners is that large regionally competitive 
retail schemes are needed as an anchor to encourage commercial growth in uncompetitive 
locations, especially when competing against peripheral centres.  As was stated by a former 
planning manager of a national supermarket group:  
 
“The concept of small retailer-based solutions to the problems of increasingly 
derelict district centres in areas of severe urban deprivation is arguably naive and 
rather over precious. There are notions about large supermarkets coming in and 
swamping existing centres. But if you go and visit the local district centre, which 
might be falling apart at the seams, a new store with all the bells and whistles, in 
qualitative terms, is exactly what is required. My criticism is that those people 
get a little bit precious about these district centres where really development is 
the only option (Willis, 2001:19).” 
 
Politically this is not a neutral issue.  Numerous research papers indicate that retail-led 
regeneration initiatives provide demand spillovers to stimulate a net increase in investment 
and retail injections from elsewhere leading to an increase in economic activities in the local 
region (Yuo et al, 2003:1).  This has been supported by a number of case studies (Cummins et al, 2005:295; Lowe, 2000:268; Bromley et al, 2004:661; Thomas and Bromely: 2002:795; 
Oc and Tiesdell, 1997:253; Lowe, 2005:450; Wrigley et al, 2002:2109).  Additional research 
also  highlights  other  benefits  such  as  employment  and  the  eradication  of  food  deserts.  
Business  interest  groups  such  as  the  National  Retail  Planning  Forum,  Business  in  the 
Community  and the  British  Council  of  Shopping  Centres  have  also put  their  weight  into 
lobbying of government and publishing best practice case studies highlighting the economic 
and social benefits of retail-led regeneration.  However a number of studies have concluded 
that large retail schemes crowds out local businesses by means of increasing economies of 
scope and scale associated with large retail developments (Thomas and Bromely: 2002:793; 
Bromley and Thomas, 2002:112; Robertson and Fennell, 2007:155; Monbiot, 2000:4).  Large-
scale retail is notoriously exclusive in its profile of retail offerings and thus there is a danger 
that mega-schemes could in fact recreate the same economic conditions as edge-city retail 
by drawing customer footfalls and anchor retailers away from smaller existing retail centres 
and high street shopping.   
The concerns regarding the crowding out of local retail and the decline of the high street 
as  an  essential  part  of  community  life  was  also  combated  using  containment  policies.  
Containment  policies  have  promised  the  redevelopment  of  toxic  brownfield  land  use  in 
deprived  inner  cities  by  channelling  large  retail  schemes  to  inner  cities  combined  with 
directed  public  revitalisation  of  the  urban  environment.    This  was  to  be  followed 
theoretically by an influx of professional white collar workers with spillovers of increased 
employment  and  more  demand  for  local  retailers  (Meen  and  Andrew  2004:  209).    The 
implementation of containment polices in the mid 1990’s forced shopping centre developers 
and competitive national retailers to expand to inner cities or to downscale their peripheral 
outlets.  The level of success of containment polices is debatable because the total volume 
of  retail  floorspace  opened  by  major  retailers  has  not  diminished  despite  containment 
polices (Wrigley, 1998:160).   
It  is  questionable  whether  retail-led  regeneration  initiatives  and  containment  policies 
have contributed to the economic revitalisation of existing inner-city retail or whether these 
projects merely lead to pitch shifting of retail and the further deterioration of existing inner-
city retail.  The case studies of retail-led regeneration policies certainly have had mixed 
results, and it is certain that retail-led regeneration and retail containment are not a panacea 
for healthy retail economies (Dixon, 2005: 180).   The aim of this paper is to critically analyse the effect that both retail-led regeneration 
polices and containment policies have had on the growth of local retail economies.  The 
paper will attempt to analyse the qualitative differences between retail-led regeneration in a 
town  centre  and  in  a  peripheral  location  on  the  edge  of  the  city.      The  results  of  two 
particular retail-led regeneration projects, Birmingham and the Solihull, will be analysed.   
The significance of these two retail-led regeneration schemes are that both developments 
opened  within  two  years  of  each  other  and  are  in  direct  competition  with  each  other, 
containing  overlapping  market  areas  and  competing  for  the  same  anchor  tenants.    Of 
greater significance though is the distance between the two centres is their location relative 
to  the  city  centre.    Birmingham  is  a true  city  centre  scheme  whereas  Solihull,  although 
located within its own council, is in reality a satellite of Birmingham and therefore an out-of-




The Retail-Led Regeneration Model 
 
The current retail-led regeneration model was originally a concept imported from the 
United States in which a number of declining inner-city areas were successfully redeveloped 
by private developers.  There the concept is called ‘Rouseification’ after Rouse, a private 
developer specialising in inner city retail developments, in particular waterfront and festival 
marketplace  themes  (Pacione,  2005:337;  Loftman,  1995:  301).    Retail-led  regeneration 
initiatives consists of a large department store, hypermarket, or regional shopping centre 
development serving a catchment beyond the boundaries of the local council or district 
which it serves, creating a net injection of retail spending within the local economy (Lowe, 
2005:450).   The development of a large anchor store should theoretically restructure the 
local  economy  to  provide  the  physical  space  for  new  economic  activities  based  on  the 
diversification of the economic activities, enable the growth of agglomeration economies, 
and attract outside investment (Healy,1991: 99).   
Retail-led regeneration initiatives were widely implemented throughout Britain during the 
post-war  Keynesian  planning  period.    Planning  policy  was  strictly  against  superstore 
development,  out-of-town  retail  developments  on  the  urban  periphery  and  attempts  to restructure the local economy (Wrigley, 1998:154).  The size of the units were comparatively 
small  and  was  built  to  accommodate  an  overflow  of  high  street  retail  through  the 
construction of small scale indoor malls, and pedestrianised high streets and public spaces 
(Tallon,  2008:131).    These  projects  were  initiated  by  the  public  sector  and  are  most 
exemplified by the unattractive modernist concrete structures and decaying pedestrianised 
high streets seen in deprived cities.   
However  in  the  1980’s  amidst  liberal  retail  polices,  the  ‘Store  Wars’  retail  revolution 
occurred  whereby  a  rush  of  private  developers  established  a  number  of  large  shopping 
centres on the periphery of cities.  Retail became increasingly concentrated in superstores, 
regional shopping centres and warehouses with extensive car parks drawing customers from 
increasing  distances  (Thomas  and  Bromely,  2002:  793;  Wrigley,  1998:  154).    This  trend 
formed the prototype behind the current retail-led regeneration model in the UK.   The 
strategy  behind  this  model  is  to  restructure  physical  buildings  and  locations  to  be 
appropriate for new kinds of economic activities in a post-Fordist service economy.  Property 
development and private sector involvement is essential for the success of these initiatives 
(Healy, 1991: 99).  Although retail-led regeneration initiatives were later restricted in out-of-
town developments due to its cannibalistic nature, it has been deemed acceptable within 
cities due to policies favouring densification. 
A number of causal factors contributed to the current retail-led regeneration practices. 
Foremost were the neo-liberalist trends in government urban policy.  These included the 
liberalisation  of  planning  controls,  tightening of  local  government budgets,  the policy  of 
pursuing private leveraging of projects by government and the overt participation of the 
private sector in policy formulation and decision making (Griffiths, 1998: 55; Turok, 1992: 
374).    Environmental  factors  also  contributed  to  the  practice.    The  decline  of  British 
manufacturing  due  to  post-Fordist  pressures  led  to  the  shift  from  a  production  centred 
economy to a service centred economy.  This led to the subsequent degeneration of city 
centre employment, urban flight to the service centred suburbs, and the development of 
toxic brownfield land uses in inner cities due to the loss of production capacity (Tallon, 
2010:177; Carley, 1990:100; Healy,1991: 99; Loftman, 1995: 301).  The model also developed 
as a result of social changes in public shopping patterns.   The modern car-oriented shopping 
patterns  favours  pedestrianised  and  climate  controlled  shopping  centres;  cafe’  cultures 
requires a controlled 24 hour shopping environment; and double income families requires economies of scope, long opening hours and centrality (Pine and Gilmore, 1999:24; Zukin, 
1998:831; Tallon, 2008:132).  
By the late 1980’s it was realized that shopping centres at the periphery of cities had a 
negative effect on traditional high street retail, particularly in inner cities.  Whether the 
decline of traditional high street retail in inner cities was primarily due to the pressure of 
large  out-of  town  shopping  centres  or  whether  it  was  due  to  wider  social  change  is 
debatable.    However  government  decided  to  implement  a  series  of  shopping  centre 
containment policies leading an appeal success rate dropping to 25% from over 50% in the 
1980’s (Wrigley, 1998:154). This had an extremely negative effect on prospective shopping 
centre schemes in that only 8 of the 50 of the schemes proposed between 1987 and 1992 
were built by 2006 (Tallon, 2010:177). 
The first of these containment mechanisms was the so-called ‘Gummer Effect’ in which 
the UK central government started opposing large retail development appeals in principle 
(Wrigley,  1998:154;  Bromley  et  al,  2004:649).      This  was  followed  by  the  ‘sequential 
approach’  to  out-of-town  developments  implemented  in  the  PPG6  and  PPG13  policies.  
Within these policies all proposed shopping centre developments had to prove that there 
was a need for the retail development as well as prove that no alternative site was available 
within a town centre.  Later a stricter ‘class of goods test’ was implemented in which it was 
additionally required to prove that the goods sold within the proposed centre cannot be sold 
from an alternative site within a town centre (Thomas and Bromely: 2002: 793; Lowe, 2005: 
451).   
Although the containment effect limited large store formats on the periphery of cities, 
the retail revolution continued quietly within cities.  Developers adapted to the prevailing 
conditions  in  a  spirit  of  ‘enlightened  self-interest’.    By  2002  4.5  million  square  metres 
floorspace  was  proposed  with  80%  proposed  in  inner  city  locations  (Lowe,  2005:  465).  
District  centre  sites  were  still  regarded  as  suitable  for  large  schemes  according  to 
containment policies, and therefore these sites were targeted.  Large store retailers also 
started making use of previously marginal locations on brownfield sites.  (Wrigley et al, 2002: 
2102).  Retailers circumvented containment polices by focusing on extensions of existing 
stores, and creating high street targeted ‘metro’ stores (Wrigley, 1998: 156).  However most 
apparent was the regional shopping centers developed in the inner cities of large regional 
cities (Lowe, 2005:450).  Some peripheral sites were still accessed on previously proclaimed land.  Other peripheral schemes were successfully motivated using employment concerns to 
define ‘need’ for retail development (Adlard, 2001, p. 533; Guy 2002: 327).   
The economic principle behind the retail-regeneration model is to introduce a key anchor 
retailer with a large amount of additional floorspace for secondary retailers thereby creating 
the  growth  of  an  agglomeration  economy  at  increasing  rates  of  return  (Ravenscroft, 
2000:2535). The retailer-led regeneration process is also linked to the historical accident 
factor  in  which  the  location  of  a  key  retailer  or  shopping  centre  will  spillover  into  the 
agglomeration  of  other  retailers  and  related  industries  over  time  (Harvey,  1989:  8).    In 
deprived inner cities it is argued that combining the scale of these retail-led regeneration 
projects  with  low  land  values  could  create  new  market  conditions  for  recentralisation 
(Ravenscroft, 2000: 2535). Often these projects are also combined with mixed use schemes 
and  infrastructure,  streetscaping  and  transportation  projects  in  order  to  broaden  the 
perceived benefits of the scheme (Guy, 2008: 385).  It is hoped that the restructuring of the 
city would also result in the spillover of upmarket residential development and high quality 
office space.  There is an assumption that when the level of investment reaches a critical 
point,  the  total  potential  value  of  the  well  located  yet  undervalued  property  becomes 
greater than the negative externalities associated with urban decay and toxic brownfield 
land uses.   This would theoretically trigger gentrification trends within the local property 
market.    However  the  process  is  not  uniform  and  the  history  of  retail-led  regeneration 
contain many hits and misses (Oc and Tiesdell, 1997:16).    
Retail-led regeneration theory assumes a direct link between property development and 
local  economic  regeneration  and  wealth  generation.    This  is  based  on  the  neo-classical 
assumption  that  free  markets  entail  automatic  efficient  and  effective  service  provision, 
completion and choice (Atkinson, 1999: 63).  Retail-led regeneration, as other property led 
regeneration projects, therefore endeavour to provide the following benefits to the local 
economy: 
•  Increased employment and income from construction and commercial activities to 
uplift the local economy 
•  Local economic growth and improved social amenities due to infrastructure and 
property development  
•  Attracting capital investment and relocating firms into the region  •  Restructuring the local economy to become more competitive regionally through 
redevelopment and economic diversification 
•  Neighbourhood  revitalisation  of  deteriorated  urban  spaces  creating  a  pleasant 
living and working environment and therefore higher property values 
•  Civic boosterism and city marketing, which results in positive public perceptions of 
the city (Turok 1992: 364; Loftman and Nevin, 1994: 308) 
 
The marketing and repositioning of cities motive is often more important in retail-led 
regeneration  programmes  than  the  economic  benefits.    Many  post-Fordist  cities  have 
acquired  the  negative  stereotype  of  an  industrial  wasteland  with  little  scope  to  offer 
potential investors.  City branding is used as a tool used to refocus the public’s core image of 
the city by creating a semiotic ‘city myth’, which is used to differentiate the city from other 
‘rust belt cities’ (Harvey, 1989: 5; Hall, 2006: 86).  These endeavors have proved successful in 
the case of Manchester, where a number of property-led regeneration projects, combined 
with cheap, well located brownfield sites and good infrastructure has revived the city with a 
net  influx  of  investment  and  workers  (Halfpenny,  et  al:  2004:  258).    The  necessity  of 
repositioning cities in the globalist economy has become crucial for local economies that 
have been marginalised due to a global change in production.  This includes the restructuring 
of industry from a manufacturing to smart industries and making cities attractive for mobile 
international capital.   
Flagship developments, consisting of a large scale, high profile, self-contained shopping 
centre or store is the currently the preferred vehicle of retail-led regeneration activities 
(Loftman and Nevin, 1994: 306).  Flagship development is a key element in marketing and 
city  branding,  because  it  creates  a  core  image  to  link  to  the  city  myth  which  detracts 
attention from the city’s historical legacy.  Although only flagship developers profit directly 
from  place  marketing  activities  there  are  potential  indirect  spillovers  to  the  local 
government  and  community  in  the  form  of  outside  capital  investment  due  to  greater 
publicity.  However the spillovers to the local government and community are generally 
speculative and come at a high risk of failure, with little tangible results amidst significant 
local disinvestment (Harvey, 1989: 7).   
The  prestige  model  of  flagship  development  has  become  the  preferred  method  of 
delivering retail-led regeneration initiatives due to budget cuts made by central government forcing local authorities to leverage regeneration with private investment.  The effectiveness 
of  flagship  projects  lies  in  the  fact  that  these  instruments  are  high  profile  and  deliver 
tangible results.  However flagship development invariably creates inequalities.  Although 
flagship  projects  provides  net  improvements  to  certain  locations  within  the  urban  area, 
these  are  usually  choice  locations,  creating  a  structurally  fragmented  city,  with  wealthy 
upmarket  residential  developments  located  close  to deprived  neighbourhoods  with  little 
social cohesion.  A further problem is that these efforts generally homogenise cities into 
clones  of  successful  cities,  mimicking  the  same  developments  and  slogans  (Griffiths, 
1998:44; Tallon, 2010:123).     
Lately  there  is  a  considerable  doubt  attached  to  the  effectiveness  and  efficacy  of 
property-led initiatives.  This is partly due to the fact that the primary beneficiaries of retail-
led projects are private sector business interests.  There are numerous instances of property-
led regeneration projects failing to provide the intended benefits to the most deprived areas 
at the cost of significant public disinvestment (Herbert, 2000: 204; Loftman, 1995: 311).  The 
Ladywood ward in Birmingham declined to the third most deprived ward in the UK in terms 
of employment after the development of a number of property-led projects between 1988 
and  1992  (Loftman  and  Nevin,  1994:  313).      £380  million  worth  of  leisure  and  cultural 
buildings were developed at the cost of disinvestment in local housing and education and at 
a council budget deficit of £120 million during the same period (Griffiths, 1998: 55).   There is 
a valid argument voiced by many that retail-led regeneration initiates often result in local 
disinvestment, and that distributive mechanisms would be preferable.  However the counter 
argument is also strong.  During the 1970’s and 1990’s the results of distributive mechanisms 
such as area based regeneration initiatives in which public funds were invested directly into 
deprived  neighbourhoods  showed  no  meaningful  results  despite  the  high  public  cost 
(Modarres, 2002:299; Turok, 1992: 374).  It was rationalised that inner city problems are 
sociological in nature and are thus unsolvable (Loftman and Nevin, 1994: 309). Retail-led 
regeneration projects on the other hand usually deliver tangible results even if unsuccessful, 
which is politically more tenable than distributive instruments (Loftman, 1995: 301). 
The success of retail-led regeneration initiatives are determined by economic factors that 
not  controllable,  nor  predictable  (Griffiths,  1998:  56).    A  causal  link  between  retail-led 
regeneration and local economic competitiveness has not been established.  There is no 
uniform methodology to predict the effectiveness of retail-led regeneration initiatives in 
developing economic competitiveness.  Traditional floorspace modelling and cost/benefit analysis does not capture the cumulative processes involved in redeveloping local economies 
(Begg 2002: 4; Cummins et al, 2005: 299).  Research has also been hampered by a lack of 
statistical data of retail facilities in the UK, coupled with contradictory research findings 
(Thomas & Bromely: 2002: 794).  However it is accepted that the successful local economies 
are those which raises the standard of living and real incomes of residents within the locality 
itself; is economically diverse creating goods and services which are regionally competitive; 
create  a  favourable  balance  of  payments;  and  have  a  efficient  internal  circulation  of 
disposable income locally (Boddy and Parkinson, 2004: 423).  National/international retailers 
in retail-led regeneration initiatives leach local disposable incomes from local businesses to 
London  or  abroad  and  are  generally  poorly  integrated  into  the  local  economy.    This 
globalisation of local retail has often resulted in a lower balance of payments, increases in 
interest rates, poor economic opportunities and a decline in savings in local communities 
(Turok, 1992: 375). 
A core weakness in the retail-led regeneration model is that property attributes of a 
particular  location  are  supplementary  to  locational  attributes  such  as  human  capital, 
innovative  capacity,  quality  of  life,  labour  costs,  labour  flexibility  and  physical  and  ICT 
infrastructure.    This  has  proved  true  in  areas  experiencing  natural  growth  such  as  the 
Southeast of England, Southern Germany, Southern Spain and Northern Italy where there 
are natural growth patterns of investment and capital.  Areas that lack suitable locational 
attributes such as Northern England, Eastern Germany, Northern Spain and Southern Italy 
have struggled to attract new businesses using property-led regeneration initiatives other 
than from local business transfers within the region (Turok, 1992: 370).  There has also been 
a natural movement of positive locational attributes to the periphery of post-Fordist cities as 
the change from secondary to tertiary economic activities has coincided with urban flight.  
Although  retail-led  regeneration  projects  have  been  widely  implemented  in  the  UK, 
especially in the Midlands, the rankings of the cities in the UK urban hierarchy have not 
changed.  Only the shopping centre retail hierarchy of major post-Fordist cities in the UK 
involved in regeneration has changed, which put the effectiveness of retail-led regeneration 
initiative in doubt (Boddy and Parkinson, 2004: 411). 
The  employment  motive  in  retail-led  regeneration  initiatives  is  also  suspect.    Retail 
employment has increasingly demanded lowly skilled, female only and temporary workers.  
These low quality employment opportunities favour migrant workers and commuters rather 
than real population movements (Dixon, 2003: 171; Dunham et al., 1994: 355).  Employment motives are only successful when full-time, permanent positions are created and investment 
is  embedded  in  local  supply  chains.    Large  scale  retail  developments  and 
national/international retailers create high local employment displacement effects of up to 
50% of newly created jobs due to the marginalisation of high street retail.  These retailers 
also make use of supply chains connected to head offices rather than local chains resulting in 
general job substitution and local economic disincentives (Robertson and Fennell, 2007:155).   
The greatest morphological impact that large retail schemes in retail-led regeneration 
initiatives has had on the city is on traditional high street retail.  Between 1945 and 2006 the 
number of independent retailers has declined by 94%.  The use of traditional high street 
retail has also shifted to top-up purchases rather than main shopping expenditures, with 
those using high  street  retail  limited  to  the  elderly  and  those  without  private  transport 
(Thomas and Bromely: 2002: 795).  This has had a resulting decrease in high street retail 
revenue of up to 50%.  It is generally accepted that peripheral retail development is the 
cause  of  pitch  shifting,  lower  property  values  and  disinvestment  in  high  street  retail, 
especially in inner cities (Dixon, 2005: 180).   
Although retail-led regeneration initiatives have certainly contributed to the decline of 
retail,  it  is  doubted  whether  it  was  the  causative  factor.    Great  social  shifts  have  also 
occurred in the UK in which community and social life has shifted to a consumerist mall 
culture.  Many large schemes function similar to mini-villages containing its own housing, 
land use mix, retail variety, transportation links, and social amenities within a safe, secure 
and controlled environment.  This is in contrast to the local high street retail in which a 
distinctive community life has disappeared altogether (Simms et al, 2003: 54).   Much high 
street retail currently consists of predominantly low quality retail such as fast food stores, 
cell phone shops, and charity shops and variety stores.  This retail provision is generally 
unhygienic, has a poor retail selection, is inaccessible by car, and has poor social amenities 
within an often xenophobic, insecure and asocial environment (Evans, 1997: 15).  High street 
retail has only managed to survive in culturally homogenous communities with closely knit 
community ties and protectionist policies.  These conditions are rare in UK city centres but 
are found in the periphery of cities.   
The historic high street retail stock is structurally inadequate to provide for the needs of 
modern retailers, lacking suitable public parking and often providing inadequate floorspace 
resulting in depressed rental rates and high vacancy rates.  Small-scale retail prominent during  the  post-war  era  has  struggled  to  survive  since  the  liberalism  of  planning 
enforcement in the 1980’s (Guy 2007: 143).  However strategies have been developed to 
combat high street retail decline.  Foremost is the revitalization of environmental concerns 
in creating a safe, secure, hygienic and aesthetically pleasing design and maintenance of 
streetscaping and facilities using BID’s.  Efforts to provide parking for car users and public 
transportation accessibility have also been addressed by local authorities (Tallon, 2010; 184; 
Jones 1989: 43).  Although effective, these measures have also been criticized as creating 
artificial  commoditised  public  spaces,  of  being  exclusionary  to  informal  traders  and  the 




The Retail-Led Regeneration Efforts in Greater Birmingham 
 
Birmingham and the Midlands region can be described as the neo-liberal heartlands of 
the UK.  Almost every conceivable property-led regeneration strategy has been implemented 
in this area.  Birmingham and the Midlands region formed the largest component of the UK 
manufacturing industry during the post-war era and many influential UK industries were 
located  there  (Carley,  1990:  100).    Consequently  the  region  suffered  the  most  from 
Thatcher’s ‘Lame Duck’ policy of ending British industry protectionism.  Most industries in 
Birmingham downsized, moved abroad or closed cutting a quarter of a million jobs in the 
Midlands and tripling the unemployment rate (Pacione, 2005:178).    
As  the  focus  of  the  British  economy  shifted  from  manufacturing  to  smart/  service 
industries, the core areas of economic production shifted to cities such as London, Bristol, 
Edinburgh  and  to  the  periphery  of  large  manufacturing  cities  (Boddy  and  Parkinson, 
2004:411).  With a high unemployment rate and the flight of the most productive segments 
of  the  community  to  the  periphery,  Birmingham  was  forced  to  adopt  a  strong 
entrepreneurial approach to restructure and diversify the city’s core economy (Digaetana 
and Klemanski, 1992:16).  The financing mechanisms of the state also forced the council to 
take  an  active  role  in  development  by  leveraging  regeneration  initiatives  with  private 
investment (Griffiths, 1998: 55). This led both conservative and labour constituencies to 
foster  strong  ties  with  business  interests  through  public-private  partnerships  (Loftman, 1995:305).    Regeneration  projects  were  centred  almost  exclusively  on  property-led 
regeneration projects, particularly flagship projects. The scope of these projects ranged from 
sporting  and  cultural  facilities,  business  parks,  convention  centres,  luxury  residential 
development,  skilled  artisan  districts  to  retail  developments  (Hall,  2006:  143;  Bailey, 
1995:87; Loftman and Nevin, 1994:311).  However the success these initiatives achieved in 
regenerating economic growth, restructuring the local economy and revisioning the core 
image of the city as an attractive location for investment has been rather unsuccessful to 
date.  
 
Figure 1: Locations of Regional Shopping centres in the Birmingham catchment area 
 
The  older  retail-led  developments  in  Birmingham  fared  especially  poorly  due  to 
competition from other retail-led regeneration initiatives in the Midlands region.  Due to the 
large number of regional shopping centres serving overlapping market areas,  as is indicated 
in Figure 1, a strong inter-regional competition developed in the Midlands. The adjacent 
Merry Hill shopping centre developed by the 1990’s, soaked up the majority of shopper 
footfalls regionally, but it functioned in a symbiotic relationship with the local high street 
retail in Brierley Hill (Lowe, 2000:268).  Birmingham’s shopping profile in the 1990’s lacked 
the prime retail offering of its peripheral competitors, consisting of a number of older public-
planned shopping centres and deteriorated high street retail.   The drab 1960’s modernist 
shopping centres such as the original Birmingham Bullring, Pallasades and Great Western Arcade shopping centres (indicated in Figure 2) were unattractive and unsuitable for modern 
retail consumption.    
A number of smaller retail-led regeneration projects were launched in reaction to the 
increasing regional competition.  These included the Mailbox development, the Castle Vale 
estate development, and the failed Brindley Place festival market-place/waterfront scheme 
which  was  converted to  office  development  (Wrigley  et  al, 2002:  2108).      An  attractive 
feature of the retail-led regeneration projects was that the public cost in supporting these 
regeneration projects was miniscule in comparison with the early sport or culture-based 
prestige projects in Birmingham (Turok, 1992: 374).  However these schemes were relatively 
unsuccessful in attracting shopper footfalls back into the shopping centre. 
 
Figure 2: The layout of the retail-led regeneration strategy in Birmingham city The Birmingham Bullring regeneration initiative was developed as a rival scheme to the 
Solihull  regeneration  initiative  (DTZ:  2005:32;  Lowe,  2005:  456).    In  a  bold  move  the 
Birmingham  City  Council  strong-armed  competing  rival  developers  to  consolidate  their 
respective  developments  into  one  major  scheme  in  partnership  with  the  Council,  who 
assumed  the  planning  and  highway  control  responsibilities,  and  contributed  prime  land 
toward the scheme (Emery, 2006:122).  Similar to the Solihull regeneration scheme the 110 
000m
2  Birmingham  Bullring  regeneration  initiative  consisted  of  a  number  of  shopping 
centres and upgraded high street retail linked in a triangular pattern to form a cohesive 
pedestrian  corridor  as  indicated  in  Figure  2.    The  flagship  scheme  was  the  Birmingham 
Bullring  shopping  centre  but  the  success  of  the  scheme  is  undoubtedly  due  to  the 
integration  of  the  different  retail  offerings  within  a  BID.    The  Birmingham  Bullring 
regeneration initiative has an estimated footfall of 40 million p.a. and an annual turnover of 
£4.1 Billion (DTZ: 2005:32).  Birmingham has catapulted to the position of third in the UK 
retail hierarchy in 2004, from a position of 14
th it held just two years prior (Barkham, 2009).   
The goal of the Regeneration strategy was primarily to reposition the core image of the city 
from a post-industrial rustbelt city to a diverse secondary business destination (Hall, 2006: 
143).  The marketing was accomplished by Marketing Birmingham, a group dedicated to 
generate publicity for the scheme (Emery, 2006: 124; DTZ: 2005: 40).  The scheme also has 
over 100 000m
2 of proposed retail floorspace in the pipeline for future extension (Emery, 
2006:125).  
Solihull  was  until  recently  a  relatively  unimportant  satellite  city  on  the  periphery  of 
Birmingham.  Solihull was granted its own local borough and steadily grew as slum clearance 
in  Birmingham  added  to  the  population  of  Solihull.    In  the  late  1990’s  the  55  000m
2 
Touchwood regional shopping centre was developed as a flagship regeneration scheme to 
establish Solihull as the prime retail destination in the Midlands (Lowe, 2005: 453).  The 
Touchwood centre linked high street retail with the older Mel Square scheme to form an 
integrated  urban  corridor  that  was  attractive  to  shoppers.    The  regeneration  strategy 
intended to fill the market gap for a regional shopping centre between Birmingham, located 
9  miles  west  from  Solihull,  and  the  West  Orchards  scheme  in  Coventry.      The  Solihull 
Touchwood scheme is technically a peripheral shopping centre due to Solihull’s location at 
the urban edge of the Birmingham metropolis, but due to Solihull’s status as a Borough the 
scheme  was  regarded  as  a  city-centre  development  and  escaped  the  sequential  test.  
Solihull’s Touchwood scheme secured the only John Lewis department store in the Midlands and opened in 2001.  The scheme has planned to be extended to 110 000m
2 by 2021 (Cross, 
2010). 
Statistically  both  regeneration  initiatives  have  a  great  degree  of  exclusivity.    The 
Birmingham city centre has the highest number of high profile retailers regionally with 42 
out of 91 leading retailers whilst Solihull (at half the size of Birmingham) has 19 out of 91 
leading retailers.  Compared to Merry Hill’s retail profile at 9 out of 91 leading retailers, this 
indicates that the level of integration between the retailers within the shopping centres and 
the local independent retail is limited.  The retail provision in Birmingham has an upper 
‘fashion’ ranking with 50% of the goods provided being within the luxury to upper middle 
fashion goods ranking (Birmingham City Council, 2009a:7).  The retail provision in Solihull is 
also primarily centred on the provision of semi-durable and durables such as clothing and 
domestic goods, though there is a sufficient food and convenience goods provision in the 
city (DTZ, 2009: 49).  The amount of convenience outlets in Birmingham as a percentage of 
the total retail space is low at 7.5% as compared to the UK average of 9%.   
The  exclusivity  of  the  retail-led  regeneration  initiatives  is  apparent  in  the  difference 
between prime to off-prime rents.  In Birmingham zone A rents found within the retail-led 
regeneration area are currently approximately £3500/m
2, while zone B rents found outside 
the retail-led regeneration area averages only approximately £1700/m
2 or 48% of prime 
rents.  In Solihull the rent relationship is healthier with zone A rents averaging £2250/m
2, 
while zone B rents average £1450/m
2 or 65% of prime rent.  However Brierley Hill in which 
the Merry Hill Shopping centre is located has zone A rents of approximately £2500/m
2 and 
zone B rents of approximately £2000/m
2, i.e. a relationship between prime rents and off-
prime rents of 80% (Own calculations based on Valuation Office Agency data, 2010).  This 
indicates that the retail-led regeneration initiatives in Birmingham did not have the intended 
effect  on  property  values  beyond  the  retail-led  regeneration  area,  while  the  results  in 
Solihull are significantly better.  The poor relationship between prime and off-prime rents is 
also  an  indication  of  pitch  shifting  and  shopper  cannibalisation  as  shopper  footfalls  are 
directed to the prime positions and diverted from other retail locations. 
The unit vacancy rate in Birmingham city centre is 17% compared to the UK average of 
11% and the total floorspace vacancy in Birmingham city centre is 15% compared to the UK 
average of 9% (Birmingham City Council, 2009a:13).  These vacant units are primarily located 
along off-prime locations.  The Touchwood and Mel Square shopping centres in Solihull also have a number of unit vacancies, however the vacancies are distributed equally amongst 
prime locations and off prime locations.  This indicates that the vacancies in Birmingham are 
structural in origin as an result of an oversupply of floorspace and an overconcentration of 
footfall to the regeneration area.  Birmingham has higher prime yields (i.e. lower rental 
growth investor confidence) in retail rents than other post-Fordist industrial cities such as 
Nottingham, Glasgow, Manchester and Leeds (Birmingham City Council, 2009b:37).   
 
 
Figure 3: Percentage standard retail rental value above base values in Birmingham, 1998-
2006 (Own calculations based on IPD standard retail rental value growth data) 
 
The rental value growth in Birmingham is illustrated in Figure 3.  The data indicates a large 
increase of rental value year on year preceding the opening of the mega-scheme as investor 
confidence soars.  After the opening of the Bullring mega-scheme retail rental values in 
Birmingham decreased considerably indicating a drop in demand due to overavailability of 
retail floorspace.  It is also noticeable that the Bullring has a negative effect on rental values 
in the rest of the West Midlands County which includes the Touchwood and Merry Hill 
shopping centres.  
Figure 4 shows the year on year growth of retail rental values.  The steady decline of 
rental value growth is immediately apparent.  The annualised rental value increases by an 
average 4% annually during the ex ante period and experiences an average -7% decline in rental value growth annually during the ex post period.  This emphasizes the lower rental 
growth investor confidence in city centre retail floorspace within Birmingham.  
The rental value growth in Solihull is illustrated in Figure 5.  The data indicates a strong 
growth  in  rental  value both  ex  ante  and  ex post  periods  with  increasing  marginal  rents 
growing up to 80% above base regional market rates over a 10 year period.  This trend is 
sustained throughout the analysis period despite the decline in rental value growth in the 
rest  of  West  Midlands  County.    These  trends  indicated  that  the  development  of  the 
Touchwood shopping centre created a strong investor confidence and positive growth in the 
local economy. 
 
Figure 4: Year on year percentage rental value growth in Birmingham, 1998-2006 (Own 
calculations based on IPD standard retail rental value growth data) 
  
Figure 5: Percentage standard retail rental value above base values in Solihull, 1996-2006 
(Own calculations based on IPD standard retail rental value growth data) 
 
 
Figure  6:  Year  on  year  percentage  rental  value  growth  in  Solihull,  1996-2006  (Own 
calculations based on IPD standard retail rental value growth data) 
The  annualised  the  rental  value  growth,  illustrated  in  Figure  6,  shows  a  predictable 
cyclical rate with increases of an average 2.9% annually during the ex ante period and an 
average 1.3% increase in rental value growth annually during the ex post period.  These 
growth  rates  indicate that the development of  the Touchwood  shopping  centre  did  not 
replace existing retail but rather fulfilled demand for retail in peripheral locations.    On site it was evident that the Birmingham retail-led regeneration initiative created an 
economically divided city.  There was a marked difference between the quality urban space 
within the regeneration area, indicated in the box in Figure 2, to the area outside.  The retail-
led regeneration area, a roughly triangular sized area located between the Bullring, Mailbox, 
and Martineau Galleries shopping centres, consists of a well integrated commercial district 
with pedestrianised high street shopping linking the major shopping centres.   The entire 
regeneration area forms an urban corridor for the high volume of pedestrian traffic in a well 
developed  and  maintained  streetscene.    Retail  within  the  scheme  consists  of  mostly 
national/international retailers offering high quality luxury goods forming what has been 
termed ‘clone’ retail, mimicking high end retail in West London.  Toxic independent retail 
such as convenience stores, charity stores and variety stores are noticeably absent, yet so 
too are local enterprises such as local restaurants, butcheries, bakeries, and other land uses 
linked to a local community.  
The retail space outside the retail regeneration area has deteriorated significantly, even 
within a few metres of shopping centres.  The retail provision also consists of almost solely 
of local independent retailers providing low quality consumer goods.  Vacancies have also 
concentrated just outside the retail-regeneration area as the retail space struggles to attract 
visitors.    There  is  an  overprovision  of  retail  space  and  the  excess  retail  outside  the 
regeneration area has a high vacancy rate.   Some peripheral shopping centres outside the 
regeneration  area  such  as  the  Priory  Walk  centre  are  successful,  yet  others  adjacent  to 
shopping centres such as the Bullring have long term vacancies.  These tenants cite the 
Bullring effect as drawing customers away from the smaller local convenience shops.   
The  local  council  supported  the  Bullring  as  a  successful  marketing  and  repositioning 
exercise.  They therefore were willing to tolerate pitch shifting and retail decline in certain 
sections of Birmingham.  Despite continued urban deprivation and retail deterioration in the 
inner city suburbs of Digbeth and Ladywood, certain sections of Birmingham has gentrified 
into high income residential areas, though the necessary middle income residential growth is 
lacking.    It  is  believed  that  the  Birmingham  retail-led  regeneration  was  successful  in 
supplementing and integrating the existing retail into a regionally competitive offering that 
could compete with peripheral competitors especially Solihull and Brierley Hill. 
The  Solihull  retail-led  regeneration  initiative  followed  a  similar  concept  to  the 
Birmingham  regeneration  initiative,  with  two  anchor  shopping  centres  developed  to supplement improved pedestrianised high street shopping.  On site it is apparent that the 
Solihull retail-led regeneration initiative has proved to be successful in establishing Solihull 
as a major economic centre in direct competition with Birmingham and Coventry.  Solihull 
retail-led regeneration has created a local agglomeration economy with spillover growth in 
the office and residential development.  Demand for office and residential development is 
struggling to be met by development (DTZ, 2009:45).  This follows the population movement 
to peripheral locations.  Vacancies in both shopping centres and high street retail indicate an 
economic cause rather than a structural cause of oversupply and pitch shifting.  
It is also apparent that the retail development in Solihull is not as exclusive as it is in 
Birmingham.  Although national/international retailers concentrate in the shopping centres 
there is a strong presence of local and independent retailers within high street facilities and 
even in the shopping centres.  Solihull has a high density of large warehouse retailers, but 
this does not appear to affect the presence of smaller independent retailers negatively.  
Poor quality local retailing such as charity shops, variety shops and independent cell phone 
retailers are also noticeably absent within the city.    
 
 
The lessons learnt from containment and retail-regeneration on urban form 
 
Retail-led regeneration has become an essential function in modern urban economies.  
The liberalisation of peripheral shopping centres in the 1980’s and the subsequent ‘store 
wars’ has forced nearby city centres to compete with similar retail regeneration strategies or 
die.  Retail-led regeneration has become so universally that the question is not whether 
retail-led regeneration is acceptable or not but rather how it should be implemented. The 
development of the Merry Hill shopping centre forced the Birmingham and Solihull local 
authorities to develop large retail-led regeneration initiatives of their own to keep their 
retail  functions  viable  in  the  regional  economy.    Large  anchor  stores  have  become  the 
epitome of retail led regeneration developments (Wrigley et al, 2002: 2102).  Birmingham 
has managed to reclaim a large portion of its retail functions by recapturing a significant 
market leakage to peripheral centres, while Solihull has established itself as the premier 
retail destination in a significant market gap between Birmingham and Coventry.   
The results of retail-led regeneration can be mixed.  Birmingham struggled numerous 
times and only partially succeeded in regenerating the retail provision by linking a number of schemes into a overarching strategy.  Birmingham managed to salvage a portion of toxic 
inner city land use by reconciling a number of retail and office schemes, though at the cost 
of the loss of significant local independent retail functions.  The Solihull initiative was a 
textbook case for retail-led regeneration, managing to create a growing local agglomeration 
economy through retail-led regeneration.  It is apparent that retail-led regeneration is not 
the panacea to urban deprivation, and its success is strongly linked to natural locational 
attributes such as human capital, quality of life, and ICT infrastructure (Tallon, 2010: 185).  
Retail-led regeneration initiatives usually follow natural population and capital movements 
(Meen and Andrew, 2004: 209).  The historical accident factor is a natural progression and 
cannot be replicated without favourable locational attributes (Guy, 2008: 385). 
Because of the historical accident factor in retail-led regeneration, many developmental 
trends are reinforced that are contrary to popular planning ethos.  Urban phenomena such 
as urban flight to the periphery, gentrification of key inner city locations, the development of 
dual economies and migrant employment are reinforced by retail-led regeneration initiatives 
(Smith,  2002:446).    Birmingham  in  particular  has  experienced  the  effects  of  inner  city 
gentrification and the development of dual economies.  Certain key locations in Birmingham 
gentrified, forming economic links with the exclusive retail provision in the inner city, whilst 
the vast majority of the city is marginalised economically with deteriorating and toxic land 
uses. 
Although  containment  polices  have  been  enforced  for  almost  two  decades,  the 
effectiveness of these policies has been limited.   Smaller district shopping centres and large 
warehouse  schemes  are  still  developed  in  peripheral  locations,  reinforcing  urban  flight 
movements.  Furthermore the scale and scope of the inner city schemes are developed to 
serve the needs of an ex-urban population who prefer travelling far distances to purchase 
luxury  goods,  semi-durable,  durable  and  bulky  goods  in  the  city  centre.    The  inner  city 
regeneration initiative in Birmingham did not provide suitable convenience and non-durable 
goods  required  by  a  local  community,  nor  a  sense  of  place  due  to  the  exclusivity  and 
surrealness of the ‘clone’ city.  Therefore there is little incentive for the movement of the 
entrepreneurial  middle  class  back  to  the  city  (Halfpenny,  et  al:  2004:  263).    Solihull’s 
regeneration  initiative  reinforced  the  movement  of  service  and  smart  industries  to  the 
suburbs,  affirming  urban  flight  trends  from  Birmingham.    The  prominence  of  essential 
services, convenience stores and non-durable and food retailers has helped Solihull to create 
a sense of place and consequently growth in the local economy. Urban flight trends are compounded by the loss of permanent employment in the inner 
cities (Dixon, 2003: 169).  Birmingham’s retail offering has displaced most of the local and 
independent  retailers  in  favour  of  exclusive  national/international  retailers,  which 
contributed to the high percentage of migratory labourers who are unwilling to relocate in 
favour of insecure employment opportunities.  The loss of local and independent retailers, 
who traditionally are self-employed and provide higher levels of permanent employment 
add to this problem.  Solihull does not appear to have this problem as the retail offering is 
varied with numerous local and independent retailers.   
There is a tolerance for the perceived negative aspects to retail-led regeneration because 
the economic and employment incentives of regeneration have become secondary to the 
repositioning and marketing priorities of the city.  It has become so essential to change its 
perception as a post-Fordist industrial city that Birmingham has risked the marginalization of 
a large portion of the city, particularly the deprived Digbeth and Ladywood areas from the 
economic core of the city.  The retail-led regeneration initiative only directly benefits a small 
group  of  absentee high  income  property  owners  and  retailers, not  the  local  community 
(Monbiot, 2000: 4).  The long term benefits are expected to spillover to the local community 
as a result of changed perceptions to investing in the city.  There is a sense of nihilism that it 
is better to divide the city economically and save the inner core from toxic land uses than to 
let the entire city deteriorate with the inner cities.   
The need to restructure post-Fordist cities has become a priority.  Competition between 
the inner city and the periphery has become greater than the competition between cities.  
Cities such as Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester and Liverpool are not in competition with 
each  other  but  rather  with  their  own  peripheral  satellite  cities  (Harvey,  1989:  10).  
Birmingham  and  Solihull  are  in  direct  competition  with  each  other,  and  the  retail-led 
regeneration  initiatives  have  been  created  to  cannibalise  footfall  of  consumers  their 
neighbouring regions (Cummins et al, 2005: 295).   Birmingham’s regeneration was intended 
to  restructure  the  city’s  economy  to  compete  in  a  post-Fordist  service  economy,  while 
Solihull  intended  to  compete  on  equal  footing  between  rival  giants  Birmingham  and 
Coventry. 
A consequence of the liberalization of retail has been the decline of local retail, especially 
traditional high street retail.  The decline of high street retail in inner cities is in part due to 
the social changes that have taken place in modern culture.  Birmingham retail has become an ideal venue to visit infrequently for purchases of luxury goods, bulky items and semi-
durable and durable goods.  However inner city retail will not be able to challenge the 
convenience and food retailing in district centres and peripheral shopping centres in terms 
of  car  accessibility,  variety,  price  and  environmental  aspects  (Ravenscroft,  2000:  2535; 
Wrigley et al, 2002: 2108).  Solihull’s retail offering has assumed the format of a mini-village 
with high accessibility, variety, long opening hours and a favourable nightlife. 
Saving high street retail is the motivation behind the implementation of containment 
policies.  The integration of pedestrianised high streets with shopping centres in retail-led 
regeneration initiatives was implemented to minimise the effect of retail liberalization on 
high street retail.  This included the integration of high streets into BID’s in order to manage 
the  environmental  concerns  such  as  crime,  hygiene  and  streetscaping  (Thomas  and, 
Bromely, 2002: 793).  However in Birmingham the integration of high street retail was futile 
in  preserving  local  retail  from  competition  by  large  schemes  and  national/international 
retailers (Guy 2002: 321).  The retail-led regeneration initiative in essence undermined the 
last  traditional  high  street  retail  in  Birmingham  and  its  links  with  the  local  community.  
Conversely the high street retail in Solihull did not appear to suffer negative effects from the 
retail-led regeneration initiative there.  This emphasizes the importance of considering the 
implementation of the class of goods test to large inner city and district level schemes as 






Retail-led regeneration has become a permanent feature in cities competing against each 
other  in  the  global  marketplace.    Retail-led  regeneration  has  become  predatory  with 
secondary cities no longer competing in a world city hierarchy with other secondary cities 
but  rather  with  their  periphery.    The  level  of  competition  between  cities  whose  retail 
schemes have overlapping catchments indicate that local economic growth is dependent on 
the region’s competitiveness.  Birmingham and Solihull both developed rival schemes to 
maintain regional competitiveness and to increase market share between each other.   
The Birmingham retail-led regeneration initiative is a typical inner city retail strategy.  This 
initiative managed to reconcile various shopping centres and high street retail with a flagship scheme into a cohesive urban corridor.  It was implemented to restructure the post-Fordist 
industrial city to become more competitive economically in a service economy.  The retail-
led  regeneration  initiative  has  had  mixed  results,  on  the  one  hand  creating  a  popular 
regional shopping destination which has revolutionised the image and vitality of the city, but 
at the loss of vital community retail functions.  Birmingham retail has served the purpose of 
as  a  luxury  and  bulky  goods  destination  but  has  lost  the  local  food  and  convenience 
functions, dividing the city into a ‘clone town’ emulating London west end shopping.  In the 
process  it  has  marginalised  the  local  economies  of  deprived  inner  city  communities.  
However Birmingham recognised that this was necessary to save a portion of the city from 
the leakage of retail to cities on the periphery such as Brierley Hill and Solihull.  The retail-led 
regeneration initiative in Birmingham was considered successful as a city marketing and 
rebranding exercise. 
The  Solihull  retail-led  regeneration  initiative  was  technically  a  peripheral  retail 
development, contrary to UK containment policy.  Solihull is a satellite city located on the 
outskirts of Birmingham and therefore any retail development in Solihull directly affects 
retail  in  Birmingham.    Solihull  developed  an  identical  retail-led  regeneration  strategy  to 
Birmingham  but  achieved  far  different  results.    The  regeneration  initiative  successfully 
integrated the local economy with regional retail functions, enabling local and independent 
retailer to be established amidst national/international retailers.  The regeneration has had 
economic  spillovers  resulting  in  a  diversifying  agglomeration  economy  which  has 
supplemented  significant  suburban  migration  and  employment  movements  to  Solihull, 
creating a healthy local economy.  Solihull retail has created a mini-village with strong ties to 
local community in which modern shopping culture has merged with traditional high street 
retail created a sense of place not found in Birmingham.  This has led to the establishment of 
Solihull as a major retail destination in the Midlands and a serious threat to the vitality of 
Birmingham’s economy. 
The  comparative  success  of  the  Solihull  retail-led  regeneration  initiative  over  the 
Birmingham initiative is attributed to favourable locational attributes.  It is apparent that 
retail-led  economic  growth  does  not  happen  in  an  economic  vacuum  and  will  only  be 
successful if the environmental conditions are conducive to investment and development.  
This puts the effectiveness of retail containment policy to question.  Retail-led regeneration 
strategies should be re-evaluated in terms of their impact on the local communities they 
intend to serve, not on densification ideals.  Should the locational attributes of a prospective retail-led regeneration site not be conducive to natural economic growth, such as in post-
Fordist cites, the retail-led regeneration could prove to be harmful to the local economy.  
This includes reinforcing urban flight, migratory labour, marginalising local enterprises, and 
the creation of a dual economy amid continued urban deprivation.  The Birmingham retail-
led  regeneration  generally  only  served  to  monopolise  retail  in  the  hands  of 
national/international retailers contributing to a leakage of local disposable income and a 
lower balance of payments whereas the peripheral initiative in Solihull was conducive to 
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